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Public Health Through Tax Incentives::
William Drayton, Jr.t
Government's increasing efforts to discourage cigarette smoking over
the last decade have generally failed.' Warnings about smoking, and
tax increases which raise all cigarette prices, harry the habitual smoker
but do not make him stop. In order to change smoking patterns, gov-
ernment must first modify its strategy. Rather than attempting to
diminish total cigarette consumption, it should focus on the more at-
tainable goal of reducing the harmfulness of what is smoked. Tobac-
co manufacturers could lower tar and nicotine levels greatly; smokers
that can't quit can switch.
A special tax on cigarette brands high in tar and nicotine would be
an effective means of executing this strategy. Such a tax would en-
courage the consumption of lower tar and nicotine brands by making
them less expensive for the consumer and/or more profitable for the
manufacturer. The tax can also be an efficient source of public reve-
nues. New York City has had such a tax in effect since July 1, 1971;2
its success in meeting both the city's public health and revenue ob-
jectives suggests that New York's lead may well be followed by other
governments, local, state, and national.3
* The opinions and analyses set forth in this article are the author's sole responsi-
bility and should not be taken to express the viewpoint of the firm of 'McKinsey :
Company, Inc.
t Associate, McKinsey & Company, New York; A.B. 1965 Harvard College; MA. 1967
Oxford University; J.D. 1970 Yale University; Member New York Bar.
1. See p. 1490.
2. Under the New York program, cigarettes with 17 milligrams of tar and 1.1 mil-
ligrams of nicotine or less are tax-free; those exceeding both standards are taxed at four
cents a pack. Thus, according to the tar and nicotine measurements of the Federal
Trade Commission in August, 1971, Winstons are taxed at four cents while lower tar
and nicotine Dorals are not taxed at all. These rates were merely added to the city's
existing four-cents-a-pack, general cigarette tax, in order not to lose revenue or reduce
whatever deterrent effect the high flat-rate tax has. Tar and Nicotine Ordinance, Local
Law 34, 5 NEw YoRK Crry, N.Y. ADnN. CODE § D46.80 (Supp. 1971).
Administratively the tar and nicotine tax simply "piggy.backs" the traditional flat-
rate tax mechanism. Both are collected simultaneously at the wholesale level through
the sale of required tax stamps, and policing one automatically enforces the other. The
New York tax applies only to cigarettes, not cigars or manufactured tobacco. Id.
3. The idea of varying cigarette taxes with the harmful components in cigarette
smoke is a simple, almost obvious reform that has been proposed, apparently inde-
pendently, several times prior to New York's consideration of the idea. On September
12, 1967, Senator Robert Kennedy proposed such a tax nationally. Letter from Dr.
Daniel Horn, National Clearinghouse for Smoking and Health, U.S. Public Health
Service, to Mayor John V. Lindsay, May 27, 1971, replying to a request from the
Mayor for comments on the proposed New York tax. In December 1970, Representative
John Busienger introduced a bill in the Massachusetts legislature that would authorize
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This article seeks to define and evaluate the tar and nicotine tax
alternative. First, it explains why government must switch to a tar
and nicotine tax strategy if it is to have a significant impact on smok-
ing. Second, it evaluates the effectiveness of such a tax, both in theory,
and in the light of New York's experience.4 Finally, it explains the
structure that would give the tax the greatest possible impact.
I. The Need for a New Strategy Against Smoking: Taxation of Tar
and Nicotine Content
The extensive research done on cigarettes during the last decade
has convinced the medical profession and appropriate government
agencies0 that cigarette smoking is a major cause of disability and
death. In the United States, over fifty medical associations have offi-
cially sought to discourage smoking.0 In the United Kingdom, the
Royal College of Physicians has announced that illnesses caused by
smoking have reached "epidemic proportions" requiring a strong pre-
ventive response.7
a master plan for taxation to include the study of relating the state cigarette tax to
tar and nicotine content. Interviews with the Clerk of the Massachusetts House and Mr.
Ronald F. Rosenblith, aide to Representative Busienger, February 1971. Recently at the
federal level, Senator Frank Moss has introduced a bill that would establish a national
tar and nicotine tax. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1972, § 3 (Business and Finance), at F, Col.
1. U.S. Surgeon General Jesse L. Steinfeld, in reporting that the Nixon Administration
is considering a series of new initiatives to reduce the hazards of cigarette smoking,
specifically suggested levying such a tax. The Wall Street J., Jan. 11, 1972, at 5, col. 2.
4. Much of the data and analyses used in this article was originally undertaken by tile
author as part of the McKinsey & Company staff working for the Bureau of the Budget of
the City of New York to analyze alternative means of increasing city tax revenues. Tie
study initially weighed a wide range of alternative tobacco taxes. The author is in.
debted to the city for releasing this material for use in the preparation of this article,
and to his colleagues at McKinsey, notably Gerald P. Hillman, for their help and criti-
cal comments.
5. These authorities include the President's Commission on Heart Diseases, Cancer,
and Stroke; the U.S. Surgeon General, and the U.S. Public Health Service.
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission has officially recommended to the Congress that
the warning label now required on all cigarette packs be amended to read: "Warning:
Cigarette smoking is dangerous to your health and may cause death from cancer, coronary
heart disease, chronic bronchitis, pulmonary emphysema, and other diseases." FtUtA,
TRADE COM7A'N, ANNUAL REPORT: 1969 at 11 (1969). The Federal Communications Con-
mission has held that it is no longer a controversial issue "that cigarette smoking Is t
hazard to public health (i.e., the main cause of lung cancer; the most important cause
of chronic bronchitis or pulmonary emphysema, etc.)." 35 Fed. Reg. 19282, 19283 (1970).
A compilation listing the various authorities alleging a relationship between the ele-
ments of tobacco smoke and disease, part of the original McKinsey study prepared for
New York City, is also on file with the Yale Law Journal.
6. A partial list includes: American Association for Cancer Research; American As.
sociation for Thoracic Surgery; American Cancer Society; American Collee of Chest
Physicians; American College Health Association; American College of Physicians, Ainerl.
can Heart Association; American Medical Association; and the medical associations of
California, New York, and Pennsylvania.
7. "Premature deaths and disabling illnesses caused by cigarette smoking have now
reached epidemic proportions and present the most challenging of all opportunities for
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Whether or not the state should intervene to limit the costs of
smoking to the individual and society,8 and to what degree, ultimately
remain, of course, political issues that each community must de-
cide. 9 However, it is clear that the trend of public policy is toward
more vigorous and determined intervention. Traditional flat rate
cigarette taxes, which have long been justified in part as a means
of discouraging cigarette consumption, have now been imposed sep-
arately by over 272 communities, by all fifty states, and by the fed-
eral government.' 0 During the last decade, their rates have risen rapid-
ly. Moreover, government has supplemented flat rate taxation with
a campaign of persuasion" and the prohibition of broadcast cigarette
advertising.12
preventive medicine in this country." ROYAL COL.LEE or PHYsI IANs, SNoIINo AND
HEALr Now 1 (1971). In January 1972, the U.S. Surgeon General concurred:
I can think of no bigger public health hazard about which we know and can
do something [than smoking).
Wall Street J., Jan. 11, 1972, at 5, col. 2.
8. Smoking's external costs include discomfort and danger to others. See note 24
infra. Smoking also causes increased welfare and public hospital expenses, hea ly forest
damage from cigarette fires, and higher auto accident rates. H. DIEHL, Toracco AND
YOUR HEALTH: THE SMOKING CONTROVERSY 108, 198, 200, 201 (1969). NATIONAL Arvtsony
CANCER COUNCIL, PROGRESS AGAINST CANCER 1970, at 42; Speer, Tobacco and the Nonsmoher:
A Study of Subjective Symptoms, 16 ARcH. ENVIRON.MENTAL HEALTH 443 (1968). Although
the association between smoking and work loss and hospitalization seems firmly es-
tablished (see DIEHL, id. at 198), exact percentages are less certain given the ambiguity
in diagnosing many diseases as well as the problems of case sampling. National pro.
ductivity may suffer also from smoking. In Britain as many as fifty million working
days may be lost every year as a consequence of cigarette smoking. ROYAL Co.LEGE OF
PHYSICIANS, SMOKING AND HEALTH Now, supra note 7, at 33.
9. Although intervention to protect the public health has long been an accepted
government function, doing so in the case of smoking is challenged by the industry
and some conservatives as an infringement of the citizens' freedom. While insuring a
clean and safe water supply is beyond the power of individual citizens and requiresjoint action, it is argued that each person is-and should continue to be-free to choose
whether or not to smoke.
There are two countemrguments to this anti-interventionist position. Tile first is that
the individual is no longer free to choose once he has begun to smoke and has become
habituated. This argument is reinforced by the fact that most people who start to
smoke do so when they are young.
The second counterargument is that the illness, disability, and premature death
linked to tobacco are harmful and costly to society as well as the individual victim
and thus justify government intervention. See note 8 supra.
Whether or not the smoker who creates these costs is able to stop at will, tile con-
siderable costs he imposes on society by not doing so justify government intervention,
if only to limit the costs and/or to seek compensation.
10. ToBacco TAx COUNCIL, INC., THE TAx BURDEN ON Ton.scco: HISTORICAL CO:,t-
PILATION 79 (1971). New York's new tar and nicotine tax is another clear indication of
the developing trend of legislative intent against smoking.
11. Led by the Surgeon General and the Public Health Service, the government
issued repeated wvarnings to the public. It caused warnings to be broadcast in reply to
cigarette advertisements under the authority of the FCC's equal-time doctrine, and it
forced cigarette manufacturers to print warnings on each pack sold.
12. Effective January, 1971, cigarette advertisements were banned from the broad-
cast media. Wash. Post, Jan. 1, 1971, § B, at 1, col. 1.
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These methods have been generally ineffective.13 The imposi-
tion of even very stiff flat-rate taxes seems to reduce sales only slightly
and temporarily.' 4 Even the high tax rate applied to cigarettes in Eng-
land, over fifty per cent more than United States' levels, has failed to
reduce total consumption significantly.' 5 Despite the new prohibition
on broadcast advertising, cigarette sales increased between 1.5 and
3.0 per cent during 1971.16 The combined impact of these traditional
means of discouraging smoking has not been great: The average per
capita consumption of cigarettes in 1971 was only sixteen cigarettes
less than in 1961-a reduction of less than seven-tenths of one per
cent.' 7
The health impact of this seven-tenths of one per cent reduction
has, moreover, been cancelled by an increase in the amount of tar and
nicotine delivered by the average cigarette.' 8 The amount of tar and
nicotine consumed increases with the length of the cigarette, and ciga-
rettes have been getting longer: The one-hundred millimeter cigarettes,
which had captured eighteen per cent of the national market by
1970, are gaining ground year by year.' 9 Further, some manufacturers
13. High cigarette taxes and publicized warnings probably limit the harm done by
smoking to some degree by discouraging some potential smokers from beginning and
by encouraging a few smokers to switch from cigarettcs to relatively less harmful cigar
and pipe smoking. All the efforts against smoking have in fact caused the manufacturers
to respond to the health issue by catering t the market 
for lower tar and icotine
brands. Manufacturers certainly know the value of advertisig low tar and nicotine
content. The Philip Morris Company introduced a new "lowered tar and nicotine
variant on its leading Marlboro brand, called "Marlboro Lights," just after New York
passed its tar and nicotine 
tax.14. An nalysis of increases in the traditional flat-rate cigarette tax in NeW York,
New York State, and five neighboring states during the last ten years reveals a small
decrease in the number of packs taxed per capita shortly after most increases " the
tax rates. McKinsey Study, part of the data and analyses prepared for New York City,
on file with the Yale Law Journal. However, probably only part of that decrease call
be explained by the deterrent to sales of post-tax price increases and the publicity about
the health implications of smoking usually associated with such increases. Because of
the relatively high tax rates of the Northeastern states studied, each new increase would
encourage smuggling as well as discourage smoking. In any case, the disincentive effect
suggested by the figures is much smaller than that sought by public health officials,
15. A. PREsT, PUBLIC FINANCE 369 (1963); and STANDARD AND POOR'S INDUSTRY SURVuIS
TOBACCO 108 (1970). However, George Weissman, president of Philip Morris, Inc., has
stated that he considered flat-rate taxes "a very present and severe threat to sales,"
N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1972, § 3 (Business and Finance), at 7, col. 1.
16. BusINESS WEEK, Dec. 25, 1971, at 56; N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1972, § 3 (Business anti
Finance), at 7, col. 2; Wall Street J., Jan. 17, 1972, at 30, col. 2. The prohibition on
cigarette broadcasts of course also ended the "equal time" previously made available
for warnings about the health consequences of smoking. The net effect of this change
may have been to reduce the public's concern about cigarettes.
17. TOBACCO TAX COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 6.
18. In 1971 the average cigarette, taking sales volume into account, had the same
tar level as 1970, but an increase from 1.3 to 1.4 milligrams of nicotine (in a range of
1.0 to 1.8) per cigarette relative to 1970. FEDERAL TRADE COMNI'N, Tim TAR AND NICOTINE
CONTENT OF CIGARETTrES, April, 1972; Maxwell, Cigarette Scorebox, BARRONs, Nov. 2,
1972, at 11.
19. Maxwell, supra note 18. Sales of one hundred millimeter filtered cigarettes ad-
vanced seven per cent in 1971, the industry's greatest gain. BUSINESS WEEK, supra note
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have recently marketed brands with filters which are likely to make
the consumer feel relatively safe, but which are supposed to give
greater "satisfaction" by using unusually high tar and nicotine levels.20
Thus, despite the government's efforts, the health situation has not
improved. This is because the government's interventions have all
shared the common, unrealistic goal of reducing total cigarette con-
sumption. Legislators and public officials must learn from these past
experiences: Most smokers cannot or will not quit.
Given a realistic recognition that aggregate demand for cigarettes
is highly inelastic, governments seeking to minimize the harm done by
smoking should consider adopting the tried strategy of the old British
Empire: Divide and Rule. Government intervention designed to re-
duce the danger of cigarettes by discouraging the production and sale
of the most harmful brands should succeed where intervention designed
to cut total sales has failed. The divide and rule strategy would then
be to direct consumption away from particular brands, rather than
away from cigarettes generally. The impact of such a plan depends on
government's ability to isolate the harmful elements in cigarettes, the
manufacturers' technical ability to reduce those elements significantly,
and the legislature's selection of an effective mechanism for imple-
menting the strategy.
The cigarette components that government intervention should fo-
16. This general trend is desirable from the industry's viewpoint because each increase
in length means an increase in sales, given the fact that smokers tend not to reduce
the number of cigarettes they smoke, even though each one is longer and more ex-
pensive. Moreover, smokers of king-sized and 100 millimeter cigarettes tend to smoke
their cigarettes as close to the butt as do smokers of regular cigarettes. Moore, Bross,
Shamberger & Bock, Tar and Nicotine Removal From Fifly.Six Brands of Cigarettes,
20 CANCrR 323, 331 (1967). These longer cigarettes, therefore, induce the smoker to
absorb more tar and nicotine than he otherwise would. FEEAL TR~anE Co.1'. REroM.
To Co,-,GRass: 1969, at 16-17 (1969); telephone interview with Dr. D. Schoplind of the U.S.
Public Health Service, Feb., 1971.
Generally, king-sized cigarettes have higher tar and nicotine levels than regulars and
the new 100 millimeter cigarettes have even higher levels. One part of the data and
analyses prepared by McKinsey for New York City, on file with the Yale Law Journal.
This study is confirmed by earlier United States' and Canadian studies using independent
measurements. Forbes, Robinson & Stanton, Tar and Nicotine Retrieval From Cigarettes
Available in Canada, 23 CANcER 910 (1969).
20. Although in general filtered cigarette smoke has lower tar and nicotine content
than unfiltered smoke, some cigarettes have only token filters and others are made
from low-grade tobacco (high in tar and nicotine) so that despite the filter the smoker
receives a highly dangerous dose. The filter thus engenders a false sense of safety. For
example, only four cigarette brands (all nonfilter) out of 121 varieties tested by the
Federal Trade Commission in August, 1971, had a higher tar content than the American
Brands Company's Bull Durham, a filter cigarette. Only three had a higher nicotine
count. Other filter cigarettes with particularly high tar and nicotine contents include
Old Gold, Marlboro, and Winston. The United States Public Health Services National
Advisory Cancer Council recommended in 1970 that "a trend noted in some of the
more recently introduced filter cigarettes, designed for increased 'satisfaction' and re-
sulting in higher 'tar' and nicotine yields, should be reversed." NATio.m Anvtsonv
CANCER COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 8, at 56.
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cus on are tar and nicotine. Medical research now accepted as the
basis of government policy indicates that they cause most of the dam-
age done by cigarette smoke,2 1 that the danger of smoking is roughly
proportional to the amount of tar and nicotine ingested22 and that
tar and nicotine levels vary widely from brand to brand.23 There are,
of course, other harmful substances in cigarette smoke, notably car-
bon monoxide,2 4 but tying tax liability to any of them would create
serious administrative problems. Determining proper standards would
be difficult, given existing research knowledge; collection and en-
forcement would be burdened with complicated testing requirements,
since at present the Federal Trade Commission regularly measures
only tar and nicotine levels.2 5 In any case, reducing tar levels will
diminish most of these other substances as well.2 0 Smokers will not
negate the health advantage gained from lower levels of tar and nico-
tine by smoking more cigarettes, or smoking the same number more
deeply.27
21. A compilation of the alleged links between various diseases and the coinponcntg
of cigarette smoke, on file with the Yale Law Journal, originally one part of tIe data
and analyses prepared by McKinsey for New York City.
22. In the words of a committee reporting to the U.S. Surgeon General: "The pre.
ponderance of scientific evidence strongly suggests that the lower tar and nicotie
content of cigarette smoke, the less harmful are the effects." Hearings on H.R. 643, 1237,
3055, 6543, and Similar Bills Before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 91-11, pt. 2, at 455 (1969).
23. See Hammond, Smoking in Relation to Physical Complaints, 3 ARcn. ENVII.
HEALTH 146 (1961); Wynder & Hoffman, Reduction of Ttinorigcnicity of Cigarette
Smoke: An Experimental Approach, 192 J. Aa. MEDICAL ASS'N 88 (1965); Bock, Moore
& Clark, Carcinogenic Activity of Cigarette Smoke Condensate, 34 J. NAr'L CANCER INst.
481-93 (1965); Forbes, Robinson & Stanton, supra note 19, at 910 (1969); Moore, Bross,
Shamberger & Bock, supra note 19, at 323 (1967).
24. For example, the level of carbon monoxide in cigarette smoke, which displaces
essential oxygen in the blood's hemoglobin, has been linked to arteriosclerosis, coronary
heart disease, and temporary mental slowing. PUBLIC HEALTh SERvicE, U.S. DrP"r or
HEALTH, ED. & WELFARE, THE HEALTt CONSEQUENCES OF SM1OKING: A REI'oar OF 'rIIl
SURGEON GENERAL 62-63 (1972). The other elements, long listed in this category, are
tar and nicotine. Not only was the classic smoke-filled room (or automobile) reported
to be dangerous to those with heart or respiratory diseases, but, according to some tests,
the level of carbon monoxide introduced into a twelve by fourteen foot room after one
pack of cigarettes had been smoked was also sufficient to reduce the auditory dis.
crimination, visual acuity, and ability to distinguish the relative brightness of lights
of completely healthy adults. Inhalation of carbon monoxide can be reduced by charcoal
filters which are, however, largely ineffective in reducing tar and nicotine. Polynuelear
aromatic hydrocarbons in tar, many of which are considered carcinogenic, could also
be reduced. REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 280 (1971); Wynder & Hoffman, Experi-
mental Tobacco Carcinogenesis, 162 SCIENCE 862 (1968).
25. Moreover, the F.T.C. has sought and won a voluntary agreement front most
manufacturers to print the F.T.C.-measured tar and nicotine content of each type and
brand of cigarette. Hearings, supra note 22, at 455, 458, and pt. 1, at 87; FEDERAL TirADe
COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE PUBLIC HEALTI CIGARETTE SMOKING Aar,
December 1967 and 1970.
26. Gases such as carbon monoxide are, of course, not part of the smoke's particulate
content. However, a reduction in tar and nicotine correlates with a reduction in carbon
monoxide. Telephone interview with Mr. Emil Corwin, National Clearing House Oil
Smoking and Health, U.S. Public Health Service, Feb. 18, 1972.
27. It has been shown that the number of cigarettes smoked, how completely each
is smoked, and how deeply the smoke is inhaled are stable habits. DIEIIL, supra note 8,
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Moreover, the cigarette industry is in a position to reduce tar and
nicotine levels significantly and quickly through a variety of tech-
niques. Manufacturers could use more high quality tobaccos, which
are more expensive but have lower tar and nicotine contents. With
minimal expense, they could employ more highly porous paper and
tobacco cuts designed for more complete burning, nitrate additives
to reduce the carcinogenic polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbon portion
of tar, shredded reconstituted tobacco sheet, and a greater proportion
of low-tar stems. They could utilize more effective filters;28 and by
freeze-drying the tobacco, they could reduce tar and nicotine levels
by more than half.2 9 In sum, the presence of low tar and nicotine
brands already on the market indicates that no significant technical
or economic barriers to safer cigarettes exist.
Having isolated tar and nicotine content as the best target for a
divide and rule strategy, the need for an effective mechanism to im-
plement the strategy remains. There are two possibilities: taxation
and/or selective prohibition of the most dangerous brands.Po
Unlike prohibition, taxation works at the margin: The new smoker
is much less likely to pay premium prices or go to the inconvenience
of obtaining bootlegged brands than a committed smoker with a firm
belief that his brand fits his personality and "taste." Both measures
at 202; Moore, Bross, Shamberger S- Bock, supra note 19, at 323, 331; cf. TIME MAETmr-
ING RESEARCH REPORT No. 1606 (1970). There is still some controversy as to whether the
cigarette smoker's "need" for nicotine is physiological or ps)chological. Telephone in-
terview with Mr. Emil Corwin, National Clearinghouse for Smoking and Health U.S.
Public Health Service, Feb., 1971. See also ROYAL COLLEGE, supra note 8. at 112-13.
Probably the most dramatic proof that the number of cigarettes smoked is not depend-
ent on tar and nicotine levels came with the introduction and rapid popular acceptance
of filters. Filters led to a sharp decrease in average tar and nicotine consumption. How-
ever, per capita cigarette consumption did not increase in that decade; it leveled oIL
TOBACCO TAx COUNCIL, INC., THE TAX BuRWFx ON To.=cco 3 (1970). It therefore seems
safe to assume that reducing tar and nicotine content per cigarette would result in less
tar and nicotine consumption, not more.
28. NAT'L ADVISORY CANCER COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 8, at 55, 56; Moore et a[.,
supra note 19; Wynder & Hoffman, supra note 23; cf. Moshy, 162 Toa.cco 22 (1966).
29. Statement of Professor W.H. Johnson, Department of Biological and Agricultural
Engineering, North Carolina State University, Hearings, supra note 22, pt. 3, at 1368-71.
Cigarette manufacturers interviewed reported that the method is not now in use. How-
ever, Professor W.H. Johnson of North Carolina State University reports that R.J.
Reynolds is experimenting with another method of modifying tobacco structure known
as "puffing" which would also reduce tar and nicotine content per cigarette by in-
creasing volume. Dr. Johnson further reports that tests are now being conducted on
the use of a volume-expanding foaming agent for reconstituted sheet tobacco that
would achieve the same effect. Telephone interviews with Professor W.H. Johnson, and
officials and technicians of several major cigarette companies in February, 1971.
30. Prohibiting smoking altogether would suffer from the same fundamental weak.
ness as past measures. Many, perhaps most smokers, would find their habit driving
them to break the law. Unless the federal government were willing and able to mount
a massive, uncorruptible enforcement effort, large-scale, high-priced smuggling would
result. Given the difficulty of preventing such smuggling, the power of the cigarette
industry, the degree to which governments have come to depend on tobacco tax revenues,
and the country's experience with the Eighteenth Amendment, total prohibition is not
a realistic option.
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are likely to be effective because the course of action they ask cigarette
consumers and manufacturers to follow-switching to low tar and nico-
tine cigarettes-is a very much easier, more acceptable path than that
of giving up cigarettes entirely. Its acceptability is further enhanced
because the firms that do switch are rewarded with a larger share of
the market. Their total profits would also be greater, assuming the ef-
fect of larger sales volume outweighed the costs of measures necessary
to reduce tar and nicotine levels. Both measures would aid those most
in need: the smoker unable to stop and the millions who start smok-
ing each year regardless of health admonitions. However, taxation is
much the more likely immediate approach as it is a less drastic in-
tervention, will raise revenue as well as serve the government's public
health objectives, and can be applied to most cigarettes without cre-
ating the potential smuggling problems of selective prohibition.al
II. An Evaluation of the Tar and Nicotine Tax
A tar and nicotine tax should be analyzed in terms of five criteria:
its efficiency as a form of intervention, its effectiveness as a public
health measure, its value as a revenue source, its ease of administra-
tion, and its equity.
A. The Tar and Nicotine Tax as an Incentive Tax
A tar and nicotine tax is a simple example of an incentive tax-
a tax designed in part to alter pre-existing market conditions, usually
by discouraging one type of purchase or course of action as against
competing alternatives. A familiar example is the use of tariffs to
discourage foreign imports. Since every tax causes some change, and
since the relevant interest groups and therefore the legislatures are
usually very much aware of such effects, every tax can, strictly speaking,
be said to have some incentive effects. It is the degree of the intended
effect of the tax in inducing such change that indicates how much of
an incentive tax it is. However, most taxes, including the sumptuary
31. Even highly selective prohibition would probably create some smuggling unless
enforced at the national level. However, should the tax act too slowly or prove in-
adequate alone, selective prohibition remains a reasonable supplementary step for the
national government to consider. Its impact would be instantaneous and unambiguous.
Combining selective prohibition of the most dangerous brands with a tar and nicotine
tax would not reduce the tax's revenues greatly since most smokers of the prohibited
brands' would theoretically switch rather than quit.
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excise taxes on tobacco and alcohol,3 2 are passed for, and in fact
primarily serve, other purposes.33
Incentive taxes are a powerful and efficient regulatory tool which
government can be expected to use increasinglyfr' They are likely to
be effective primarily because they exploit potent competitive market
forces. A well-designed incentive tax changes the profitability and
market position of any one manufacturer relative to his competitors.
A cigarette manufacturer who lags behind in shifting to low tar and
nicotine brands and is therefore subject to taxes which absorb a sub-
stantial portion of his normal per pack profit margin, will feel an
unmistakable, sharp pressure to bring his products beneath the tax's
cut-off points. In a competitive situation his only alternative to paying
his profits over to the public treasury will be to lose a part of his market
share. Thus, the tar and nicotine tax magnifies the power of its im-
32. Some sumptuary excise taxes are affixed according to the undesirable element in
the commodity, such as the alcoholic content of wine. Distilled spirits or wine above
twenty-four per cent of absolute alcohol by volume are taxed at a rate of $10.50 on
each proof gallon. 26 U.S.C. § 5001 (1970). Differential rates are applied to wines: those
with less than fourteen per cent of alcohol by volume, generally table wine, are taxed
seventeen cents per wine gallon; those with between fourteen and twenty-one per cent
are taxed sixty-seven cents per wine gallon; and those with between twenty.one and
twenty-four per cent, generally port or sherry, are taxed *2',: per wine gallon. 26 U.S.C.
§ 5041 (1970). Beer is taxed at a rate of $9.00 per thirty-one gallon barrel. 26 U.S.C.
§ 5051 (1970). If beer were taxed at the distilled spirits rate, the amount due would be
S26.04. Despite the apparent parallel with the tar and nicotine tax, these taxes are not
perceived as incentive taxes designed to reduce consumption. The higher rates for
higher proof drinks are defended instead primarily on the grounds of progressivity.
Moreover, there is a great deal of difference between beer and scotch, table wine and
sherry-much more so than between Winstons and Marlboros. This difference substantially
reduces the potential effectiveness of a tax designed to cause switching by creating price
differences. Nonetheless, the differences that do exist may in fact encourage some marginal
switching from distilled spirits to "the poor man's drink," beer.
33. See J. DuE, INDIREcT TAXATION IN DEVELOPING EcoNO .IEs 63-64 (1970); STAFF OF
THE JOINT EcoNoMic CoMM., 88TH CoNG., 20 SEss., TIE FEDERAL TAx SYsms: FAcrs AND
PROBLE-M S 150 (1964).
34. Incentive taxes allow the government to intervene in many areas of production
and consumption without assuming the burdens of operating the production enterprise.
Government operations are often classic monopolies, either because competition is
legally prohibited (as with the police) or because the services provided are at prices
well below cost (as with sanitation or health services). Such monopolies have become
inefficient and unresponsive; the task is now to create a government that can provide
essential services, police the market economy, reallocate resources, and set social priorities,
through more effective, responsive, and efficient mechanisms.
Taxation is but one of several means by which government can anend the existing
market situation through incentive devices. Government could ensure that adequate
resources are given to those whom it wishes to target for specific services by issuing
chits or vouchers redeemable in cash by any qualified and licensed person who provides
the specified service. For services like sanitation, government could act as a bargaining
agent representing its citizen constituency in awarding short-term franchises to inde-
pendent contractors and then policing and evaluating their performance. Government
bounties could be paid directly to those who have done something the state wants
done, and could be used, for example, to replace the corruptible police monopoly at
least in areas like white-collar law enforcement. Incentive taxes are thus negative
bounties penalizing those who fail to do what the government uants.
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pact by pitting the high tar brands against all others.Y Moreover, be-
cause government has a vital interest in tax revenues, the use of taxes
as a means of public policy intervention leaves much less chance that
the intervention will not be enforced than is often the case with other
forms of regulation.
Not only can an incentive tax work, it is likely to do so quite ef-
ficiently. Its primary enforcer is the market mechanism, not a clumsy
and costly bureaucracy. Government merely creates the incentive; the
decision of whether or not the advantages of meeting the incentive
standards justify the cost of change remain with those most familiar
with the facts and most interested in making a correct decision-the
affected producers and consumers. In other words, government does
what it is best suited to do, determine public policy and priorities,
leaving producers and consumers free to make specific production and
consumption decisions. If they do not respond as the legislature in-
tended, government can easily and quickly change the direction and/or
the degree of pressure behind each incentive.
Incentive taxes not only work through, but may actually improve,
the functioning of the market. 36 If a government is seeking to force
some change, such as lowering the tar and nicotine content of cigarettes,
it probably feels the change is justified by societal costs, whether or
not the costs can be accurately measured. An incentive tax is thus a
rough user charge, a price representing the costs of an unsatisfactory
35. Moreover, since companies already satisfying the standards set for tax exemption,
and/or those relatively close to meeting the standards would benefit from such a dif-
ferential tax, opposition from the industries to be taxed might be less than what one
would otherwise expect. The opposition to a new incentive tax, however, is likely to
be more vigorous than is the case with more traditional across.the-board taxes-e.g.,
excise and sales taxes. This is so because an effective incentive tax will force uncotu.
fortable changes on an industry of usually politically well.organized companies, whereas
the traditional flat-rate in the end affects only consumer prices. Although the impact of
a tar and nicotine tax would vary a great deal from company to company, no industry
source has yet supported such a tax.
36. Some reformers have, however, long argued that the current flat.rate tax on
cigarettes should be replaced by an ad valorem tax on the grounds that the flat.rate
tax contributes significantly to the oligopolistic structure and lack of price competition
in the industry by bearing down proportionately more heavily on any low-priced cla-
rette. See Robertson, Concentration in the Tobacco Industry as Affected by Tax Policies
in TAXATION & BUSINESS CONCENTRAION, (The Tax Institute cd. 1950). See also N.
SHILLING, EXCISE TAXATION OF MONOPOLY 225-30 (1969). A tar and nicotine tax would
run afoul of this argument because it differentiates according to the degree to which
a cigarette endangers the public health and not according to price, However, price
competition in the cigarette industry is undesirable from the perspective of public
health policy. Government almost certainly does not wish to induce new companies
into the industry or to foster the aggressive competition or price-cutting that would
result. Its intent seems clearly to be to discourage smoking, not vice versa, Price
competition would be especially harmful from a health point of view: Because high
tar and nicotine tobacco is relatively inexpensive, it would probably be preferred by
manufacturers of low-priced cigarettes.
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condition.37 Adding such charges to the economic calculations of pro-
ducers and consumers will force them to recognize more fully the
true costs and benefits of their decisions.
Though neither government regulation nor taxation is now con-
sidered dangerously unorthodox, incentive taxation sometimes is. Often
this fear is due to a misapplication of the concept of tax "neutrality,"
the view that a "good" tax, while raising revenue, does not disrupt ex-
isting, presumably optimal competitive relationships. Incentive taxes
are in this sense clearly not neutral. However, their intentional effort
to alter the status quo may well constitute a refinement, not a disrup-
tion of the market. Moreover, as controlled "disruption" is the raison
d'etre of an incentive tax, such a tax should be measured against the
traditional test of neutrality only to see whether it creates any unin-
tended market change.
B. The Tar and Nicotine Tax as a Public Health Measure
That incentive taxes are a generally effective form of public inter-
vention does not guarantee, of course, the effectiveness of the tar and
nicotine tax specifically. However, at analysis of market economics
suggests that the tax will succeed in diminishing tar and nicotine con-
sumption. Cigarette manufacturers, distributors, and retailers could
respond to a tar and nicotine tax in three ways: (1) they could pass
on all or part of the tax on high tar and nicotine brands to the cus-
tomer through higher prices; (2) they could absorb the taxes; or
(3) they could increase prices of all brands and thus distribute the
cost of the tax to smokers of all brands. In all probability the industry
will respond, as it did in New York, in a combination of all three
ways. State and local taxes have to be collected from numerous local
vendors, each of whom will decide which response best suits his cir-
cumstances. Even a federal tax collected from the manufacturer would
still leave these dealers free to choose whether and in what manner
to pass on increased prices from the manufacturers."s
To the extent that the tax is borne by the consumer, with high tar
and nicotine brands clearly identified by a higher price, both con-
sumers and manufacturers should be pushed toward lower tar and
37. The costs of the smoking-related illnesses and premature death cannot of course
be quantified. Even if exact charges could be calculated, administrative limitations
would probably not allow as many rate distinctions between the different goods in any
taxed class as the differences in the so imposed costs would justify.
38. Some retailers now pass on the slightly higher wholesale price for "100" cigarettes
while others do not.
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nicotine brands. Consumers are apt to wonder about paying higher
prices for products thereby labelled as more dangerous, and each
purchase should make them wonder and worry anew. Manufacturers
with low tar and nicotine brands will gain market share as consumer
preference shifts as a result of this concern. New product introduc-
tion and promotional efforts3" aimed at this growing part of the mar-
ket 40 will encourage even more consumer switching.'1 Thus, a benign
cycle of consumers and vendors reinforcing each other's moves towards
low tar and nicotine cigarettes should result.
The industry's second possible response is to keep prices, and the
price relationship between different brands, unchanged by absorbing
the tax.42 There is a point at which this option becomes economically
impossible-and the industry's willingness to absorb will undoubtedly
stop long before this point, except perhaps as a short-term tactic de-
signed to discredit the tax.43 Given typical margins, the manufacturers
cannot absorb more than four cents a pack without losing all profit
on the brand taxed.44 Absorption is more likely when the tax is small
39. Distributors and retailers may also favor brands that give them a better profit
margin by, for example, giving them the best display positions and more columns In
the vending machines.
40. Promotional efforts may succeed if one assumes that preference for any one
brand of cigarette is primarily, if not exclusively, based on something that goes on fit
the mind rather than in the body. See Robertson, supra note 36, at 33.
41. However, even if a tar and nicotine tax were reflected in varying retail prices,
some consumers, attempting to assess the relative hazards of different cigarettes, might
be confused if they depended on price distinctions alone. A tar and nicotine tax with
three different rates-like New York's 0, 3 and 4 cents a pack-could lead each retailer
to sell cigarettes at as many as six different prices, with up to three prices for regular
and king-size brands of varied tar and nicotine content and three prices for the gen-
erally higher-priced 100 millimeter brands. Possibly some relatively safe 100 millimeter
cigarettes would be selling for more than shorter cigarettes with higher tar and nicotine
levels. However, the probability of this confusion occurring is limited: Not all retailers
maintain the small price differential for 100 millimeter brands, and the 100's generally
have higher tar and nicotine levels.
Some confusion might also occur because prices will vary from retailer to retailer
(because of differences in overhead, competltion, the use of tobacco as a central or
attraction item, etc.). Consequently, even with retail prices that fully reflect the tax's
differentials, a low tar and nicotine cigarette may have a higher price when retailed
by Store A than a high tar and nicotine cigarette retailed by Store B. This risk would,
of course, decline rapidly as the differential between taxed and exempt cigarettes
increased.
Fortunately, these problems are more apparent than real. Consumers who buy only
one brand will not be affected. Other consumers are unlikely to be misled by markups
that vary from store to store, as such variation does not affect the price differences
between brands at any particular outlet.
42. For example, retail tobacconists may attempt to maintain the current simple one
and two price structure, with higher prices in some outlets for 100 millimeter cigarettes,
especially where they must sell large volumes quickly such as at concessions in athletic
stadiums or railroad stations. This has clearly been the case in New York. The size of
the tax will be a major factor in these decisions: A few cents per pack can obviously
be more easily absorbed than a dime. See pp. 1505-06.
43. In 1933, the major cigarette manufacturers cut their prices forty per cent to
deal with "economy cigarettes" sold by competitors. Robertson, supra note 36, at 31-32.
44. See p. 1513. This calculation does not include wholesaler and retailer margins
because these men are unlikely to be willing to give up much of their margins to protect
one brand over another as long as total sales are not immediately threatened.
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and consequently less costly than the inconvenience of collecting it.
Thus, all but the smallest tar and nicotine taxes are not likely to be
fully absorbed, except possibly as a temporary measure.
The industry's third option, increasing prices across the board, is
a more likely response. Because the habitual smoker's demand is highly
inelastic, tobacco distributors and retailers can raise prices generally,
disregarding varying tax rates, without losing significant sales volume.
They are somewhat limited in so doing, however, by their competi-
tion with one another and their fear of smuggling. Because this re-
sponse affects the tax's incentives in approximately the same manner
as the second response, absorption, they can be discussed together.
Even if the retail prices do not fully reflect the tax's differing treat-
ment of various brands because of industry absorption or general price
increases, the same benign cycle of vendor/consumer shifts towards
low tar and nicotine cigarettes should occur just as if the differences
were passed on to the consumer. Although the tax's direct impact on
the consumer would be reduced, it will be increased vis-a-vis the in-
dustry. If the tax on a high tar and nicotine brand is absorbed, the
profitability of that brand will suffer proportionately. Even if prices
are raised across the board, losses on high tar and nicotine brands
will be supported by the untaxed, low tar brands. In either case, the
manufacturers and vendors would be given a most compelling rea-
son to switch as quickly as possible into the more profitable, safer
cigarettes. They could do so by developing new low tar brands, down-
grading existing ones, and giving greater sales emphasis to their safer,
more profitable untaxed brands. These efforts will in turn affect
the smoking consumer.
This second, industry-led phase of the switching cycle will, how-
ever, be more difficult to start than the first for all but a federal
tax. A single local or state tax is unlikely to affect enough of the mar-
ket to force the manufacturers to change their marketing plans. How-
ever, a series of such taxes, either because of their cumulative effect
or their trend-setting nature, should have sufficient impact to set the
cycle in motion.45
But even in the short-run and without a major impact on the na-
45. After New York's tar and nicotine tax was enacted, the Philip Morris Company
introduced "Marlboro Lights," a variant on their leading Marlboro brand with tar
and nicotine levels "lowered" below the city's cut-off points. This introduction of a
variant on a major brand, instead of an entirely new name, was a departure from the
industry norm. At the same time, American Brands introduced a conventional new" low
tar brand, "Lucky Ten." The introduction of these brands may have been caused by
factors other than the New York tax, such as a growing consumer demand for low tar
cigarettes as a result of government warnings. It seems probable, however, that the tax
at least added to the already considerable "health issue" pressure on the industry, and
possibly suggested a way to respond.
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tional market, absorption and across-the-board price increases will not
necessarily enable established high tar and nicotine brands to main-
tain their market share-the measure of success in the industry-in
a community with a tar and nicotine tax. A local government anxious
to ensure maximum local consumer switching may employ a num-
ber of methods to ensure that the tax's warning and incentive are
not obscured: increasing the tax's differentials, regulating prices, and/
or generating publicity. Raising the tax differentials significantly, by
far the most effective response, would encourage competition and re-
duce the number of cases in which it is less expensive to absorb the
tax than to pass it on. Second, government could require that retail
prices mirror distinctions made by the tax. A form of such price
regulation is now in effect in many states for alcoholic beverages, an-
other sumptuary item. The New York tar and nicotine ordinance
tax specifically allows the city's Director of Finance to impose such
controls.46 Lastly, government could itself publicize or require re-
tailers to publicize the differing tax rates for each brand.47 Govern-
ment could foster such awareness, for example, by causing different-
colored tax stamps to be applied to each pack depending on the rate
paid. Such actions would increase consumer awareness of price (and
health) differences among brands and would be consistent with the
public health purpose of the tax.
Industry experience suggests that consumers will respond to such
warnings and incentives, if they are also given an alternative that
does not require them to stop smoking. In the 1930's, smokers demon-
strated that price does make a difference: The major national brands
lost fifteen per cent of their sales to "economy brands" with lower
prices but relatively little advertising.48 In the 1950's and early 1960's,
smokers dramatically demonstrated that they will switch to safer ciga-
rettes: Sales of non-filter cigarettes were halved between 1956 and
1967. 49 The fact that cigarette consumers have previously demon-
strated considerable sensitivity to price and some awareness of the
health hazard5" certainly suggests that they will respond to the tar
and nicotine tax's use of both factors together.
New York's experience seems to support this expectation. An analysis
46. Tar and Nicotine Ordinances, Local Law 34, 5 NEw YORK CIT', N.Y., ADMIN.
CODE § D46.8.0 (Supp. 1971).
47. In spite of his authority to control prices, the Finance Administrator chose to
act initially to require only that all retailers post notices provided by the city explain-
ing why and how much each brand is taxed. See The City Record, Nov. 30, 1971, at
5471, col. 2, and N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1971, at 7, col. 3.
48. Robertson, supra note 36, at 29-34.
49. See U.S. DEP'T OF ACRICULTURE, June, 1970, at 9 TOBACCO SITUATION.
50. See note 13.
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of the tax receipts from the city's two cigarette taxes, the old four-
cents-a-pack, flat-rate tax and the new tar and nicotine tax, sug-
gests that there may have been a shift from taxed to exempt brands
of approximately twelve to thirteen per cent of all cigarettes sold
in the city.51 This estimate is especially encouraging as New York is a
rather difficult test case: Even before the incentive tax was imposed
the city had one of the highest per pack cigarette taxes in the coun-
try and consequently a major smuggling problem.52 While this means
that the incentive differentials had to be greater than elsewhere to
have the same impact on the city's inflated prices, the fear of en-
couraging even more smuggling led officials to impose small differen-
tials of three and four cents. Although each retailer is required to
post the amount each brand is taxed and why, most retail prices
in the city do not reflect the tax's low rates.53
The twelve to thirteen per cent estimate of consumer switching
could be wrong for three reasons.
First, it is possible that the pretax distribution of brands sold in
New York was different from the national mix used in calculating
the shift. If New York consumers were already purchasing more low
tar and nicotine brands than the national average, the shift estimate
would be too high. Unfortunately there is almost no evidence avail-
able on this point.
Second, if the period of analysis coincided with a national trend
away from high tar and nicotine brands, the twelve to thirteen per
cent figure would also be overstating the impact of the tax. How-
ever, this was almost certainly not the case. The average tar and
nicotine per cigarette consumed nationally during the period did
51. This estimate is computed by determining how many packs of cigarettes actually
passed through the city's tax mechanism by dividing total revenue from the old four-
cents-a-pack flat-rate tax by four. Then, by taking the pretax proportion of total ciga-
rette sales attributable to each level of tar and nicotine, one can compute what the
size of the new tax should be if no shifting had occurred. The average monthly revenue
from New York's tax has been 15.4 per cent below that figure. (The montis of July
and August 1971 were excluded from this calculation because the revenue generated
in these months was temporarily depressed by administrative start-tip problems.)
The difference would be explained if there had been a shift of 12.7 per cent of all
cigarettes sold from high tar and nicotine to exempt brands. This figure assumes that
the ten per cent of cigarettes above only one of the two standards (and therefore taxed
at only three cents) will be twice as likely to be switched to the zero cent rate as the
seventy-five per cent of all brands (taxed at four cents) which are farther from tie
borderline. The monthly revenue figures were supplied by Mr. Peter Shalleck of the
New York City Finance Administration, January and June, 1972.
52. See p. 1502.
53. The low tax differentials of three to four cents a pack allow many retailers to
continue to charge one price for all brands. This presumably limits the tax's impact
on the consumer. Indeed, if the tax had no impact, its failure might have been explained
by the inadequacy of the incentive. Still, the failure of the tax's distinctions to be
reflected fully in retail prices suggests that future taxes should have larger differentials.
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not decrease, it increased.54 Thus, unless New York consumption was
shifting against national trends for reasons other than the tax, the
estimate seems to err on the side of being conservative, if it errs at all.
Third, New York's significant level of smuggling, about thirteen
per cent of all cigarette sales in the city,O may distort the calcula-
tions. 5 Smugglers may prefer to sell high tar and nicotine brands
because of the greater taxed-untaxed differential. If they were able
to manipulate their market, this would create an exaggerated im-
pression of shifting to untaxed brands in measurements based only
on cigarettes actually taxed. But this danger seems limited. There
was only about a two per cent increase in the volume of both smug-
gling and avoidance attributable to the tax over its first ten months."'
Moreover, the smugglers probably have to supply whatever brands
54. Revenue estimates based on the 1971-72 brand sales volume and tar-nicotine
level figures are higher, not lower, than 1970.71. The average level of tar remained
constant but the average level of nicotine increased significantly. Maxwell, Cigarette
Scoreboard, BARRONS, Dec., 1971; Feb., 1972; and the Apr., 1972, F.T.C. Tar and Nico.
tine Measurements.
55. Although the city has 3.8 per cent of the nation's population, its traditional
four-cents-a-pack flat-rate cigarette tax is collected on only 16.5 billion cigarettes, 3.3
per cent of national sales. The assumption that the difference is smuggled is supported
by the fact that urban centers have the highest proportion of smokers, followed by
suburbs, and then rural areas. DIEHL, supra note 8, at 122-23,
56. The calculation of twelve to thirteen per cent indicates what is happening among
those who buy from legitimate dealers. Since those who buy from both legitimate and
illegal sources will almost always buy the same brand in both places, the trend observed
among sales by legitimate dealers may also be reflected in the black market. On the
other hand, some smokers of brands now subject to the new tax may have sought out
bootleg sources to avoid the tax. This last possibility is somewhat tempered by the
fact that cigarette smugglers pass on to their customers only part of the difference
between their purchase supply cost and legitimate retail prices. Thus, some New York
smuggling operations are reported to be charging a higher price for cigarettes subject
to the tar and nicotine tax than for those that are exempt. Interview with Mr. Morris
Weintraub, Managing Director, Wholesale Tobacco Distributors of New York, Inc.,
Dec. 23, 1971.
57. The two per cent increase attributed to the tar and nicotine tax is derived its
follows. For the first ten months of the fiscal year 1971-72, the total rise in smuggling
and avoidance for New York was 3.8 per cent. This 3.8 per cent figure is computed
by comparing the average monthly tax receipts for the first ten months of the fiscal
year 1971-72 with the average receipts for 1968-71. The tax receipt data were supplied
by Mr. Peter Shalleck, New York City Finance Administration. During the period
1968-71, average per capita consumption remained virttually static: 2640 cigarettes per
capita in 1968 vs. 2648 cigarettes in 1971. ToBAcco TAx COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 3.
Since the city's population has also remained static during 1968.71, the 3.8 per cent
smuggling and avoidance estimate should not be increased by any increase iI total
national sales.
However, it would be wrong to attribute the 3.8 per cent increase solely to the tar
and nicotine tax. On June 1, 1971, the sales tax was raised one per cent-which Is
equivalent to .5 to .6 cents a pack. The tar and nicotine tax had an average initial
impact of 3.5 cents a pack. The state cigarette tax was then increased three cents a
pack in February 1972. Although one can see a further drop in taxed sales after Feb.
uary 1972, it is extremely difficult to disentangle the effects of the different taxes
directy. However, a reasonable assumption is that the tar and nicotine tax caused only
as much of the loss as its portion of the increased tax burden, roughly half the 3.8 per
cent loss.
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their customers demand.58 Finally the smugglers' response to the tax
actually seems quite different; they are reported to be charging higher
prices for brands subject to the tax. 9 Thus, the impact of the tax's
incentives seems not to be lost even on those who do not legally
pay it.
While the twelve to thirteen per cent estimate may require some
modifications, the revenue figures do suggest that the tar and nico-
tine tax has had at least some of the public health impact intended.
C. The Tar and Nicotine Tax as a Source of Revenue
For those who envision the tar and nicotine incentive tax solely
as a revenue raiser as well as a regulatory measure, a potential ob-
jection to the tax is that it might not be dependable or sustained
as a source of funds. Public officials may be unnerved because reve-
nue will decline to the extent the tax actually lowers tar and nico-
tine consumption. They should not be: The amount of revenue to
be expected from the tax can be predicted 0 and adjusted quite easily.
Exact predictions are, of course, impossible because the responses
of the tobacco industry and its customers to a unique, new stimulus
are unknown. Predicting state or local revenue is even more uncer-
tain because of smuggling and the differing sizes of the jurisdic-
tions. But these uncertainties are largely a function of the tax's
novelty: Switching by consumers in response to the tax will probably
be concentrated in its first year or so. Thereafter, revenue should
hold relatively constant, and reliable future estimates can be made
from this initial experience. Even now, with only New York's limited
experience available, revenue calculations made from relatively ex-
treme assumptions establish a narrow range of likely results for a
national tax. The following table shows the probable revenue that
58. Smugglers would have to increase the number of high-tar and nicotine cigarettes
sold dramatically to account for the switching reflected in the city's revenue figures.
Even if all the increase in smuggling were in high-content brands, and if all prior bootleg
sales of low-content brands 'were replaced with high-content sales, the increase in high tar
and nicotine cigarettes sold necessary to account for New York's switching could be
reached only if prior bootlegged sales had an exceptionally large proportion of low.
content brands, a rather unlikely eventuality.
59. Interview with Mr. Morris Weintraub, and Mr. Alan Weintraub of the Cigarette
Merchandisers' Association (New York), December, 1971.
60. The McKinsey estimate of the annual revenue that New York City could .xpcct
from its tar and nicotine tax was 422.6 million. Although revenue for the first six
months was running at a $22.7 million annual rate, the slow start up in July and
August, added smuggling and avoidance caused by other increases in the local cigarette
tax burden, and some continuing switching to low tar brands may push actual first
year revenue slightly below $22.6 million.
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would be generated in the first year of a national tar and nico-
tine tax of four different rates:6 '
Estimated Revenue from a National Tar and Nicotine Tax
National Revenue Medium Revenue per
(Millions of Million Population
Dollars) (Millions of
Per Pack Tax Low Medium High Dollars)
0, 2, 3 cents 606 639 672 3.2
0, 3, 4 cents 778 839 901 4.2
0, 5, 6cents 1,116 1,239 1,352 6.2
0, 9, 10 cents 1,691 1,978 2,205 9.9
Estimates of the revenue a local community could expect from
the tax can be roughly calculated as a proportional share of the na-
tional estimates equal to its per cent of the national popula-
tion. This initial calculation should be refined by accounting for
smuggling and avoidance likely to be associated with the particu-
lar locality.62 Areas with relatively low retail prices will generally
gain sales and tax revenue from high price areas with the size of
the increase depending on the size of the price differential and the
distance from the other jurisdictions. 3 There may also be minor
variations in revenue due to varying smoking habits.
However, even if the tax produces less revenue than expected, its
rates can always be increased. Thus, even a local government with an
61. These estimates are all based on the assumption that tax liability would result,
as in the case of New York, at cut-off points of 17 milligrams of tar and 1.1 milligrams
of nicotine per cigarette. A midrange revenue estimate for the first year of a national
tar and nicotine tax with rates of 0, 3 and 4 cents a pack is 1839 million; I similar
estimate for rates of 0, 9 and 10 cents a pack is $1,978 million. Assuming that total
demand for cigarettes remained unchanged, each additional penny added to the existing
flat-rate federal tax of 8 cents per pack would rate 1255.8 million in new revenue a
year. TOBACCO TAX COUNCIL, Tile TAX BURDEN ON TOBACCO 6 (1970).
62. Smuggling and evasion can be estimated front past increases in cigarette tax
rates, although a tar and nicotine tax should lead to somewhat less smuggling than
an equivalent flat-rate cigarette tax as it would provide smokers with the legal alternative
of avoiding the tax by switching to low tar and nicotine cigarettes. For a discussion of
increases in cigarette tax rates see BUREAU OF TIlE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T Or CONMtERCE,
STATE GOV'T FINANCES IN 1970 (1970). Given past experience, revenue estimates can as-
sume that additional tobacco taxes will not lead to a rapid, lasting drop in cigarette
consumption although it may help discourage some people from starting the habit and
a small number from continuing. Cf. CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, FINANCING MU-
NICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN DENVER (1955); Hamovitch, Sales Taxation: An Analysis of tie
Effects of Rate Increases in Two Contrasting Cases, 19 NAT'L TAX J. 411 (1966); Me.
Allister, Tile Border Tax Problem in Washington, 16 NAT'L TAX J. 362 (1961).
63. This effect tends to be hidden because the areas with highest cigarette retail
prices (and taxes) are generally urban, and city-dwellers smoke more on average than
non-urban Americans.
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acute smuggling problem can assure itself of the revenue it needs. In
New York, which probably has the worst smuggling problem in the
country, adding a penny a pack to the rate, a twenty-five per cent in-
crease, probably would not have increased smuggling and avoidance
significantly: When new cigarette taxes totalling seven cents a pack
were imposed in 1971-72, such losses increased only about four per
cent.64
In sum, a tar and nicotine tax should provide a significant and.
reliable source of new revenue, as well as an important means of
cutting public health costs.
D. The Administration of a Tar and Nicotine Tax
Compared to most taxes, let alone direct controls, a tar and nico-
tine tax is easy and inexpensive to collect. All cigarettes sold in the
country are now subject to state as well as federal flat-rate excise
taxes. Consequently, any new or increased cigarette taxes can "pig-
gyback" on existing collection mechanisms. 63 The usual procedure is
for each pack sold to be stamped by a licensed tax agent who is thereby
responsible for collecting the tax and who is paid a small percentage
of collections for his services. A tar and nicotine tax can be collected
by these agents in the same way as the present flat-rate taxes.
A tar and nicotine tax would require the agents to take one addi-
tional simple step. Before stamping each pack in a crate, they would
have to determine the appropriate tax by checking the brand on a
one-page card issued by the Federal Trade Commission, listing ead
brand and type of cigarette by tar and nicotine content.06 Of course,
when the periodic FTC tests indicate a change in a cigarette's tar
and/or nicotine content, tax liability would also change.
A tar and nicotine tax would, however, create serious problems
for vending machine companies. 67 Although modern vending equip-
ment can handle four prices, most older machines can deal with only
64. See note 57 supra.
65. State governments would have no trouble in piggy-backing on their own taxes.
Local governments without a cigarette tax of their own would, however, probably have
to work out an agreement with their state's tax administration to permit joint stamps
and common licensing of agents.
66. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, TAX AND NICOTINE CoN'ix"r OF CIc. MrrEs (issued
periodically).
67. For example, some of the older machines located in markets like New York
with unusually high prices will have trouble moving to prices of sixty.five or seventy
cents a pack because at least four coins will be required for each transaction. Telephone
interviews with Mr. Alan Weintraub, The Cigarette Merchandisers' Vssociation (New
York) and Mr. Classano, Rowe International Corporation, vending machine manufac-
turers and operators, February 1971.
1505
The Yale Law Journal
two or three,68 and some of the oldest can sell at only one.0 0 A tar
and nicotine tax with its different rates would force many owners
to choose between absorbing the tax on some cigarettes or charging
more for all.70 Even those who could adjust their machines to charge
several different rates would face extra conversion, clerical and serv-
ice costs. Further, because the machines record only the total num-
ber of packs sold and because the operating companies have not usually
maintained inventory control by brand, some service men might pos-
sibly report more low-priced sales than actually occurred and pocket
the difference.7' Moreover, if the price differences were not in nickel
or dime increments, none of the machines could account exactly for
the tax. Periodic readjustments in the tax liability of various brands,
required in response to new FTC tar and nicotine ratings, would
create a further small,72 but periodic, cost to vending machine opera-
tors. The vending machine industry's difficulties would be substantially
increased if it were legally required to charge prices reflecting a tar
and nicotine tax's different rates. Many of the old machines belong-
ing to small businessmen and clubs could not comply and would have
to be put out of operation unless they were exempted from the require-
ment. However, governments anxious to have retail prices reflect dif-
ferences in the tax rates but wishing to avoid placing these extra bur-
dens on vending machine operators, could exempt them from the
regulation requiring retail prices to reflect the tax's differentials while
68. In New York City, only half the cigarette vending machines can handle three
or more prices; an additional forty per cent are able to charge two different prices,
Telephone interviews with twenty vending machine companies in the metropolitan
area, February 1971.
69. The old one-price machines are owned and operated primarily by clubs, restau.
rants, and small stores. Increased price variation would reduce the value of these older
machines somewhat, thereby hurting the small businessmen.
70. In either case the vending machine company would find sales of low tar and
nicotine cigarettes more profitable than those taxed at a higher rate, which should
lead operators to seek to sell a larger percentage of low tar and nicotine cigarettes.
71. Vending. machine operators in New York City have experienced a short.ternt
conversion problem, a permanent increase in clerical costs, a new fall in sales due to
smuggling, and some problems of theft by servicemen as a result of the tar and nicotine
tax. (Correspondence from Cigarette Merchandisers' Association (New York) to Richard
Lewisohn, Finance Administrator, and Mr. Harry Katz, Assistant Finance Administrator,
July to December 1971; interview with Mr. Morris Weintraub and Mr. Alan WeIntraub
of the Association and the Wholesale Tobacco Distributors of New York, December 23,
1971.) One of the largest vending companies, Paramount, claims a conversion expense of
$16,000. However serious the costs of conversion and increased record keeping, the vend-ing machine companies' chief complaint is a drop in sales allegedly ranging up to four-
teen per cent. (Correspondence between vending machine operating companies, November
and December 1971.) The vending companies affected attribute these losses to smuggling,
although the number of packs actually taxed declined only 2.8 per cent following tle
imposition of the tar and nicotine tax and increased state sales tax.
72. This cost would be substantially smaller than that of initially adjusting to several
different rates because it could be accomplished primarily by shuffling brands In the
columns of the machines.
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still insisting that they post a notice on each machine informing the
public how much tax was levied on each brand on sale in the ma-
chine. Alternatively, they could levy an extra tax on those choosing
not to conform with the requirement.
Cigarette bootlegging is a serious problem for local and state gov-
ernments with relatively high tobacco taxes." Obviously, extensive
smuggling created by a wide range of price differentials between
jurisdictions is highly undesirable: It deprives both the government
and legitimate dealers of needed revenues; it creates a strong incen-
tive for businessmen and enforcement officials to share in the large
profits available from smuggling; and it provides a major source of
income for organized crime.74 The possibility of smuggling is thus a
strong argument against high tax localities increasing their rates still
further.
However, this argument has definite limits. The fear of smuggling
need not inhibit either the federal government or local governments
with relatively low tobacco taxes from increasing the taxes on ciga-
rettes. Furthermore, significant differentials can be created without
raising the average price if existing cigarette taxes on low tar brands
are reduced, a move which need not produce a net revenue loss if the
tax on high brands were simultaneously increased.
Nevertheless, smuggling remains a significant constraint for some
communities. Under a tar and nicotine tax, the amount of smug-
gling (and switching) should increase with the proportion of all ciga-
rette brands taxed at the higher rate, as well as with the size of the
incremental tax. As more brands with reduced tar and nicotine levels
and a lower tax liability become available, the incentive to smuggle
will be more than proportionately reduced.Y
An additional problem, especially for smaller local governments,
is tax avoidance through extra-jurisdictional purchases. Like smug-
gling, the effect of this avoidance will depend upon the rate of the
tax relative to the taxes of the surrounding areas and the distance
73. See, e.g., p. 1502 supra.
74. D. CRssEy, THEFT OF A NATION 245 (1969); R. SALrmnO & J. To.tru'ms, Tie
CRIME CONFEDERATION 38, 158 (1969); letter from Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New
York to Congressman Emanuel Celler, Jan. 23, 1970, stating, "[C]igarecttce smuggling has
proved to be a highly profitable source of income for elements of organized crime .... *
75. The tobacco industry in areas subject to smuggling could minimize evasion
under a tar and nicotine tax by not raising cigarette prices on cigarettes not subject
to new taxes. The industry campaigned vigorously against New York's new tax on the
grounds that the tax increase would encourage smuggling, an entirely legitimate argu-
ment. However, the industry's initial effort to raise prices five cents across the board
once the tax was enacted, even on those cigarettes not subject to the tar and nicotine
tax at all, is not consistent with its sense of urgency and commitment in dealing with
the problem.
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which local citizens must travel for lower taxed brands. Instead of
going to the trouble of buying high tar cigarettes in another juris-
diction, at least some consumers, especially new ones, will probably
switch to a safer, cheaper brand.76
In high-tax jurisdictions existing revenue losses from smugglingT
and other forms of cigarette tax evasion might be reduced with a
stronger law enforcement effort. In New York, for example, the cur-
rent level of enforcement is clearly inadequate. The city's Cigarette
Tax Enforcement Unit operates on an unvarying nine-to-five, no-
weekend work schedule, a fact presumably well known to the smug-
glers.73 The increased temptation to smuggle created by high-tax local
governments increasing their taxes on cigarettes might well be offset
by increased and more effective law enforcement.
E. The Equity of a Tar and Nicotine Tax
Any increase in cigarette taxes, regardless of form, will be some-
what regressive. Although the middle class and the wealthy spend
more on tobacco than the poor, this expenditure is a smaller pro-
portion of their income.70 However, a tar and nicotine tax should be
less regressive than a customary flat-rate tax: The poor consumer can
escape the tax entirely by switching to low tar brands, and if the tax
does force him to switch, the net result of health cost savings might
even prove quite progressive.
In sum, a tar and nicotine tax gives a government an effective tool
for inducing reduction in tar and nicotine levels, while providing a
76. Although most smokers have strong short-term brand loyalty, the typical smoker
changes brand allegiance periodically. The new federal ban on cigarette broadcast
advertising may weaken brand loyalties. Brand market shares have, in any case, flue.
tuated widely over time (STANDARD & PooR's, supra note 15, at 106-08). However, short
term brand loyalty for cigarettes is quite high. (See Consumer Dynamics in 1/h Super-
market, at PROGRESSIvE GROCER K89 (1966).)
77. Mr. Albert Sohn of the New York State Commission of Investigation estimates
that the State and City of New York lost $342 million in revenues as a result of cigarette
smuggling over the last six years. The New York Post, Jan. 18, 1972, at 4, col. 2.
78. Testimony of Mr. Beverly Starkey, chief of the New York Special Investigating
Division and Mr. Joseph Haggerty, head of the Cigarette Tax Enforcement Unit, before
the New York State Investigation Commission, Jan. 19, 1972. Cigarette smuggling fn
New York is a misdemeanor, regardless of the volume smuggled. However, the civil
tax penalty is stiff-l00.00 a carton plus fifty per cent of the unpaid cigarette tax.
79. Any increase in cigarette taxes, regardless of its form, will have to meet tile
objection that such an increase is regressive. The poor and near-poor begin smoking
at an earlier age and smoke more than the more wealthy and better educated. A. PREsr,
PUBLIC FINANCE 370 (1963); Heath, 101 A.M.A. ARCIL INTERNAL MEDICINE 377 (1958);
McArthur, Waldron & Dickinson, The Psychology of Smoking, 56 J. ABNORMAL & SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 267, 267-75 (1958); Salber & MacMahon, Cigarette Smoking Among High
School Students Related to Social Class and Parental Smoking Habits, 51 AM. j. PUBLIC
HEALTH 1780 (1961). Smokers with annual incomes of. less than $6,000 spend a roughly
constant proportion of their income on tobacco; wealthier smokers spend proportionately
less. DIEHL, supra note 8, at 122-23.
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reliable source of revenue. Although a flat-rate tax poses fewer ad-
ministrative problems, a tar and nicotine tax, which in any case uses
the same collection mechanism as the flat-rate tax, is quite adminis-
trable. However, smuggling and extrajurisdictional purchases may les-
sen the effectiveness of a tar and nicotine tax, and the tax, like all
excise taxes, may be somewhat regressive.
III. Engineering an Effective Tax
Designing the most effective tar and nicotine tax involves four con-
siderations: the limitation of the tax to cigarettes, the best milligram
cutoff points for tar and nicotine liability, the optimal rate structure,
and the level of government imposing the tax.
A. Taxing Cigarettes Only
Health and administrative reasons dictate that the tax be restricted
to cigarettes. In terms of health, pipe- and cigar-smoking entail in-
gesting a very much smaller quantity of tar and nicotine. Thus, while
cigarettes comprise roughly eighty per cent of all tobacco sales, they
are the cause of ninety-six per cent of all tobacco related deaths.80
Therefore medical authorities argue that cigars and pipes should be
given relative encouragement. s t But cigar and pipe smokers are sub-
stantially less likely to be regular smokers and are much more likely
to switch both smoking mode and brand than cigarette smokers.8 ' The
80. Bell & Laing, Statistical Analysis of Mortality Rates of Cigarette, Pipe and Cigar
Smokers, 100 CANADIAN MEDICAL ASSN J. 806 (1969).
81. Cigar and pipe smoke is so heavy and alkaline that inhaling is unpleasant and
therefore rare. In early 1971, the Royal College of Physicians (London) reported that:
The (resulting) remarkable disparity of risk between smokers of cigarettes and
smokers of pipes and cigars suggests that much saving of life and health might be
achieved if cigarette smokers were to change to pipes and cigars.
ROYAL CoLLEGE, supra note 7, at 131. To encourage such switching, the Ro)al College
advocated tax differentials. In fact, such differentials already exist in te United States:
For example, the federal government taxes cigars with the same tobacco content as cig-
arettes at $0.75 a thousand rate instead of the $4.00 a thousand rate applied to cigarettes.
26 U.S.C. 5701(a)(b) (1954).
No study has been undertaken as of this date which has compared the danger of
smoking small cigars to that of smoking cigarettes. Telephone interviews with Dr.
George Moore, Roswell Park Memorial Institute; Dr. Woodward, Department of Agri-
culture (Philadelphia Laboratory); Dr. Don Schoplind, National Clearinghouse for
Smoking and Health; and Mr. Brauninger, Federal Trade Commission, February 8, 1971.
Dr. Moore suggested that small cigars were probably less dangerous than cigarettes be-
cause they are likely to be inhaled less frequently, and because fewer are likely to be
consumed by the average smoker on any given day.
However, even so, the pipe smoker has a mortality rate eleven per cent higher than
nonsmokers. Garfinkel, The Association Between Cigarette Smoking and Coronary Heart
Disease and Other Vascular Diseases, 44 ButL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 1496 (1968). See also
SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT 233 (1964).
82. See, e.g., TIME MAf-KEMNG AND RasAcuA R.oRT No. 1605 (1970).
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cigar industry has consequently found it difficult to pass increased
costs on to the consumer.8 3 Thus, tax increases on cigars and pipe
tobacco would undoubtedly have the opposite effect of accelerating
their persistent long-term loss of tobacco market share.
Administratively, it is easier to tax only cigarettes because a new
cigarette tax can be collected through mechanisms already established
for collecting the current cigarette taxes, whereas taxes on other forms
of tobacco would generally require new collection procedures. More-
over, Federal Trade Commission tests of cigarette tar and nicotine
content would provide a dependable, generally accepted, and no-cost
method of determining the liability of particular brands and types
of cigarettes. To extend a tar and nicotine tax to cigars and pipe to-
bacco, however, government would have to develop and implement a
measuring and testing system for a large number of low-volume tobac-
co products. Since relatively little research has been conducted on
cigar and pipe smoking, determining appropriate standards would also
be a problem.8 4
B. Delimiting Tax Liability
Since a small amount of tar or nicotine is not "safe," but only less
harmful than a larger dosage, there are no clear, medically deter-
mined cutoff points for tax liability. Consequently, the points at which
tax liability occur should be selected so as to produce the largest
and most rapid reduction in both tar and nicotine levels. As manu-
facturers can reduce tar without altering nicotine content and vice
versa,85 a government seeking to diminish the consump tion of both
elements should base tax liability on both.
More than one cutoff point for one or both substances can exist,
and government could create a wide range of corresponding tax rates.
It would probably be desirable, for example, to offer an additional in-
centive for the small class of cigarettes with exceptionally low tar and
83. Annual Reports compiled by Cigar Manufacturers Association of America and
First National City Bank, Letter of Apr., 1970.
84. Moreover, past experience with cigar and manufactured tobacco taxes has bcn
discouraging. Although all the states, and at least 272 localities tax cigarettes, only
twenty-two states and seventeen localities tax other tobacco products. Congress repealed
the tax on manufactured tobacco in 1965, primarily because it was considered especially
regressive. New York State imposed a fifteen per cent tax on cigars and pipe tobacco
in 1959, but the tax was repealed in 1961, after massive smuggling and mail order
evasion, a drop in retail sales of twenty-five to thirty per cent, declines in tobacconists'
sales of other goods, and spirited opposition from the retailers supported by the press.
See N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1959, § 3 at 1, col. 8; June 15, 1960, § 4, at 1, col. 5.
85. The Federal Trade Commission's Tar and Nicotine Content of Cigarettes, which
is issued periodically, shows variations in the relationship between the tar and nicotine
levels in individual brands from November, 1970, to April, 1972.
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nicotine levels.8 6 However, New York's experience with its 0, 3, and
4 cent tax indicates that to achieve adequate impact at the retail level,
each tax increment should ideally be at least a nickel; and this factor
clearly limits the number of levels most governments will be able
to impose.
The determination of the exact cutoff points for tar and nicotine
involves an inevitable tradeoff. When the level of tar and nicotine
subject to the tax is lowered, more smokers and brands are affected
by the monetary incentive and more revenue is gained. On the other
hand, when the level of taxable tar and nicotine is raised, more brands
are left untaxed, the consumer has a greater choice of brands to switch
to, and the taxed manufacturer must confront a greater number of
untaxed competitive brands. An additional crucial consideration is
that assuming manufacturers believe that lowering a brand's tar and
nicotine levels a great deal would undermine brand loyalty, the in-
centives for manufacturer change created by a variable tax would be
greatest on brands just above the cutoff points.8 T From the standpoint
of manufacturer incentive, the cutoff points should thus be just be-
low the levels contained in a large number of cigarette brands. Present-
ly, a group of over sixty per cent of all cigarettes exists within a nar-
row range just above 17.0 milligrams of tar per cigarette and 1.1
milligrams of nicotine per cigarette.88
More specifically, a tar cutoff point between 17 and 18 milligrams
or 18 and 19 milligrams, and a nicotine cutoff point between 1.1
and 1.2 milligrams or 1.2 and 1.3 milligrams appears to maximize
the tax's impact.89 While any other point or combination of points
86. Providing special reductions or exemptions from existing flat-rate taxes as well
as from the extra charges of a tar and nicotine tax for the small number of cigarettes
with exceptionally low tar and nicotine counts-e.g., those with less than 10 ings. of tar
and 0.6 mgs. of nicotine per cigarette-would be a valuable refinement of the incentive
structure that would involve so little revenue loss that it might be acceptable even to
governments giving high priority to the goal of revenue generation. Providing this addi.
tional incentive would underline the tax's public health objective, thereby increasing its
potential educational impact.
87. This consideration is important because as the number of consumers shifting from
a taxed-brand decreases, the manufacturer is less likely to alter the tar and nicotine con-
tent of his brand for fear of jeopardizing his remaining market. However, if he can easily
get the tar and nicotine content of his brand below the cut-off points, even a slight de-
crease in his market might push him to avoid the tax, thereby causing an involuntary
switch by his remaining consumer market.
88. McKinsey compilation on file with the Yale Law Journal, originally one part of
the data and analyses prepared for New York City.
89. In a range of ten to thirty milligrams per cigarette of tar, sLxty-three per cent of
all cigarettes produced fall within the narrow band of eighteen through twenty milli-
grams. The next largest such three milligram grouping would be nineteen through
twenty-one milligrams, which accounts for approximately forty-five per cent of all
cigarettes produced. A tax cutoff between seventeen and eighteen milligrams or eighteen
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is possible and may become desirable as tar and nicotine levels shift,
17.0 milligrams of tar and 1.1 milligrams of nicotine per cigarette
seem to be the most effective cutoff points now. These cutoff points
provide more revenue than a higher cutoff would;9 0 they leave a larger
number of cigarettes subject to the tax's incentives. Yet, whatever in-
centive impact they lose by leaving fewer brands tax-free for consumers
to switch to they gain by having a larger number of cigarettes very
close to the border thus enabling manufacturers to avoid the tax with
relatively little effort. They are the cutoff points adopted by New York.
The tax rate could be increased if either or both of the two cutoff
points is exceeded. Since tar and nicotine levels are usually closely
related,01 cigarettes with both tar and nicotine levels above the cutoff
points are likely to contain more tar and more nicotine than ciga-
rettes with one of the elements above and the other below the cutoff.
Consequently, higher tax rates are appropriate when both cutoff points
are exceeded. This reasoning suggests a three-tier system of incremental
taxation with low or no tax increase for cigarettes with tar and nico-
tine content below both the cutoff points, and a sharp increase in
tax liability if one cutoff point is exceeded, and another, smaller in-
crement if both points are violated.
As switching takes place after the enactment of the tax, fewer and
fewer cigarettes will be subject to the pull of the tax's incentives.
Consequently government should probably plan to review the cut-
offs periodically to determine whether they should be lowered to
ensure that the tax's effectiveness is maintained. Such periodic, gradual
lowering of the cutoff would maintain the tax's incentive impact at
a high level, allow the industry to cut tar and nicotine gradually
without disrupting brand loyalties, and provide a relatively steady
flow of revenue from the tax despite steadily receding tar and nico-
tine levels.
and nineteen milligrams therefore appears to be the point of maximum leverage. In
a range of 1.0 to 1.8 milligrams of nicotine per cigarette, a pattern somewhat similar
to that of tar content is apparent; sixty-seven per cent of all cigarettes fall in the
1.2 to 1.4 milligram band and seventy-three per cent in the 1.3 to 1.5 milligram band.
90. A seventeen milligrams of tar cutoff would yield a local government approxi-
mately seventeen per cent more revenue than an eighteen milligram cutoff, assuming it
four cent a pack rate for cigarettes above the standard and the probable switching as
a result of the tax.
A 1.1 milligram per cigarette cutoff for nicotine would yield approximately three per
cent more revenue than a cutoff of 1.2 milligrams assuming a four cents a pack rate
and estimated switching (based on New York City's experience) as a result of the tax.
91. McKinsey calculations based on FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, TAR AND NICOTINE CON-
TENT OF CIGARETrEs, November, 1970, April, 1972; Maxwell, Cigarette Scorebox, IIA"RONS
(Fall 1970).
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C. Determining the Tax Rates
The tax rates applied to different brands of cigarettes can be varied
depending on their tar and nicotine content either by rearranging
existing taxes or by simply increasing the rates applied to the high
tar and nicotine brands. Given the importance of significant differ-
ences between the tax rates applied to cigarettes falling on different
sides of the tar and nicotine cutoff points, government could ideally
employ both means.
However, governments are much more likely simply to increase the
rates applicable to high tar brands. How big should these additional
levies be? The first problem is to determine the minimal selective
increase in the tax necessary. If there are to be three different tax levels
(0, 1, and 2 cents a pack), cigarettes above both cutoffs must be taxed
at least two cents more than untaxed brands. In terms of the manu-
facturers' ability to absorb the tax, a two cent tax would approximate-
ly halve average profits, a powerful incentive. This estimate is based
on the fact that while the historical profit margin is approximately
two cents,9 2 any tax absorbed would necessarily result in a federal tax
savings of approximately one-half (48%). Thus, absorbing a four-cent-
a-pack increase would theoretically wipe out all profit. However, even
four cents may somewhat underestimate the tax necessary to insure
against manufacturer absorption of the tax. Manufacturers could help
cover losses on high tar brands with profits from other untaxed brands,
although this is not likely to continue for long. It is somewhat more
likely that losses in some local markets where a brand is subject to the
tax could be covered by profits from the rest of the market, though
this would not be possible if the tax were national and would be-
come increasingly difficult as more and more governments enacted
similar taxes. Moreover, to the extent that the high tar and nicotine
tobaccos are generally the least costly, profit margins on cigarettes with
cheaper tobacco may be higher than the industry average, thus allow-
ing even more absorption. Finally, although wholesalers and retailers
have no interest in protecting sales of one brand against another, they
may help manufacturers absorb at least small tax differences both as
a matter of industry solidarity and, more importantly, as a means of
keeping their record-keeping and sales process simple.
Another sort of minimum rate is determined by the inability of
vending machines to handle differentials smaller than a nickel. Thus,
92. STA.NDARD & PooR's, supra note 15, at T114 (1970). However, company profit mar-
gins vary widely.
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differentials of at least five cents, preferably ten cents a pack are
desirable to ensure that retail prices generally reflect the tax.
In contrast to the question of a minimum tax rate, it is not clear
that there is a ceiling above which tax rates should not rise. The
chief limiting factor for local and state jurisdictions is the fear of
smuggling. This restraint applies especially to those localities that
already have relatively high cigarette taxes. Thus, for example, New
York City felt it could not impose new cigarette taxes much over
four cents a pack. 3 Within the range established by these minimums
and perceived maximum rates, governments will probably set rates
primarily in light of their revenue needs and the importance they
attribute to their public health objectives.
Thus the most promising combination of cutoffs and rates ap-
pears to be a three-tier system: The eighty per cent of all cigarettes
with more than 17.0 milligrams of tar and 1.1 milligrams of nicotine
would be taxed at the highest rate; the nine per cent that exceed
only one standard would be taxed at a slightly lower rate; and the
eleven per cent below both cutoffs would not be taxed at all. The
rate applied to double violators must be at least two cents and
should be more than four or five cents a pack.
D. Level of Government
While a tar and nicotine tax could be adopted by any level of
government, New York's reluctance to raise its rates above three and
four cents a pack for fear of additional smuggling suggests that the
level of government does make a difference. In contrast to New
York, the federal government could impose a national tar and nico-
tine tax with little or no concern for smuggling.0 4
Particular local conditions as well as the size of the jurisdiction
must also be considered. Thus, for example, state and local govern-
ments with relatively low tobacco taxes should be able to impose
stiff new tar and nicotine taxes without stimulating a flow of smug.
gled cigarettes into their jurisdictions. Moreover, new taxes in such
areas should reduce local sales to smugglers. Increases in cigarette
taxation in low-rate jurisdictions would also allow new cigarette im-
93. When enacted, New York's tar and nicotine tax made the city cigarette taxes tile
highest in the nation. Nevertheless, fourteen states, including afll of New York State's
immediate neighbors, still had higher ratios of tax to average retail price. Based oit
comparisons made from COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, State Tax Reporter on state tax rates.
94. For much the same reasons only the federal government would find It easier to
implement selective prohibition than local governments subject to smuggling.
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posts in high-tax areas without an increase in smuggling over present
levels.
Another local condition that must be weighed in designing any
new cigarette tax is the proportion of the population within the
jurisdiction that commutes to or from other jurisdictions regularly.
If it is a significant percentage, revenue calculations should be lowered
to account for "avoidance," a tendency to buy more often in the near-
by low tax areas. Avoidance is more likely to be a problem for New
York, for example, than for other areas. However, if avoidance is al-
ready occurring, incremental losses may well be small as in New
York.95
The imposition of a tar and nicotine tax by a local or state gov-
ernment will have a much lower incentive effect on national ciga-
rette manufacturers than would a national tax, or even a number of
local and state taxes. The New York tax, for example, applies to only
3.3 per cent of the taxed cigarette sales in the nation. Manufacturers
may be reluctant to make major product or marketing changes in
response to special tax problems encountered in only a small part
of their market.
The leverage local taxes can have on national producers should
not, however, be underestimated. Even New York's small 3.3 per cent
of national sales amounts to 16.5 billion cigarettes a year, hardly an
insignificant market. Further, the warning effect of a tax varying by
tar and nicotine content may be extended beyond a local jurisdic-
tion by commuters, tourists, other visitors, and possibly the news
media. Moreover, the impact of local taxes on the cigarette industry
will be magnified if and to the extent that it appears to the indus-
try that the tar and nicotine tax is becoming a national trend.
Even if the national manufacturers succeed in appearing to ignore
the first few local governments' tar and nicotine taxes,0O these taxes
will still give local cigarette customers an incentive to switch to safer
brands, and any such switching will reduce the manufacturers' high
tar and nicotine production. Because retail pricing decisions are made
by a great number of local wholesalers and retailers, and because
these dealers would have to pay the local taxes (at least initially) and
then make the decision to absorb or pass the tax on, the manufac-
95. See p. 1502.
96. It is possible that the industry might seek to undercut the tar and nicotine tax
innovation by making it seem ineffective. The industry has lobbied against the tax
vigorously thus far, clearly perceiving it as a threat. It could afford to do so, even in
the face of steep local taxes, if a procedure for supporting local dealers with resources
from the rest of the industry-possibly analogous to the oil companies' support for local
outlets during gasoline price wars-could be worked out.
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turers should find it difficult to orchestrate uniform pricing in tile
face of a differentiated tax. Moreover, local governments can choose
from a wide range of steps, ranging from required notices to fixed
prices, to ensure that local incentives are not lost.0t
A national tar and nicotine tax could be collected from the manu-
facturers-unlike state and local taxes which can be collected only
locally from wholesalers and retailers. A tax imposed on the manu-
facturer tends to pyramid, or grow as it is passed on through the
chain of distribution. By contrast, a tax levied on one locality's mer-
chants tends to be partially absorbed as some merchants try to avoid
losing customers to neighboring communities by holding prices down.
For both reasons a national tax would better serve the government's
public health purposes, as it would create a bigger price advantage
for safer brands. Moreover, a tax collected from a few manufac-
turers is slightly easier to enforce than one collected locally-though
this burden should not be overemphasized as there is almost no in-
cremental cost to "piggybacking" either a state or local tar and nico,
tine tax on current collection systems, which exist in all fifty states.08
Thus, the most desirable tar and nicotine tax would be a federal
one. Its terms would not be constrained by smuggling and avoidance;
it could not be ignored because it would affect the national market;
and it could be easily collected directly from the manufacturers. How-
ever, the tax could still be effectively implemented by most states
and local governments, especially those which are large, have rela-
tively low existing taxes, and have a small percentage of commuters
who travel to and from adjacent low tax areas.
Conclusion
Government can take a realistic step toward improving the public
health by imposing a tar and nicotine tax. Recognizing tile fact that
most smokers are habitual and that it is therefore unrealistic to ex-
pect to reduce total consumption quickly, the tar and nicotine tax
seeks to reduce the harmful elements in what is smoked. It divides
high against low tar and nicotine brands and gains much of its ef-
fectiveness from the resulting competitive clash. It is a good source
of revenue and poses few administrative problems. It should give
government the power to force a change in smoking patterns. 00
97. See p. 1500.
98. See p. 1505.
99. Governments facing stiff citizen resistance to new taxes may find the dual health
and revenue intent of the tar and nicotine tax a significant advantage,. In the words of
one high New York City official, "Who can oppose a tax on cancer?"
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